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Abstract 
 
The Nigerian Counter Terrorism Strategy recognised that force alone was not enough to combat 
violent extremist elements in Nigeria and that a multi-faceted approach was required to counter the 
threat of violent extremism. The Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA) was tasked with 
developing an ambitious countering violent extremism (CVE) programme consisting of three 
elements: community-based counter radicalisation; strategic communications; and de-radicalisation. 
The de-radicalisation element of the CVE programme included establishing a prison based de-
radicalisation programme for sentenced and pre-trial prisoners.  
The challenge facing ONSA and the Nigerian Prisons Service (NPS) in setting up the de-radicalisation 
programme was considerable. Prison conditions were basic; there were no existing offending 
behaviour programmes on which to build; risk assessment was rudimentary and focussed on escape 
risk; awareness among staff at all levels of de-radicalisation programmes, their content and how they 
should be managed, was minimal; specialist staff were in short supply and had no training in running 
interventions; and resources, both physical and financial, were limited. 
This paper sets out how ONSA and NPS went about establishing the de-radicalisation programme and 
describes key elements of that programme, including: creating a supportive operating environment; 
risk and needs assessment; types of intervention; and programme management and staffing. It 
highlights the challenges and lessons that can be drawn from the operation of the programme during 
its first 18 months, which will be of particular interest to low resource, post-conflict and fragile states 
that are seeking to establish their own basic de-radicalisation programmes.  
 
Key words: de-radicalisation; Boko Haram; Nigeria; extremism; terrorism; disengagement; prison 
programmes; interventions. 
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2 Dr Bryans (consultant on de-radicalisation, penal reform and criminal justice issues – see: www.panopticon-
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Introduction 
This paper describes the development and implementation of a prison based de-
radicalisation programme in Nigeria. The programme was developed from a zero base in 
terms of policy, programming, staffing, tools and approach. The authors of this paper were 
part of a technical assistance team that were involved from the beginning of the de-
radicalisation programme development in October 2014 through to the end of phase one in 
April 2016.3 During this period the authors had the opportunity to make regular visits to the 
prison running the de-radicalisation programme in order to observe activities, monitor 
implementation and have informal conversations with the Treatment Team and prisoners. The 
visits also provided an opportunity for the authors to mentor the de-radicalisation Treatment 
Team members. The authors also conducted review sessions with members of the Treatment 
Team and Treatment Management Team and provided regular training events for the Teams. 
At various points during the planning and implementation of the programme, the authors had 
the opportunity to interview alleged members of Boko Haram, and other violent extremist 
groups, to discuss their backgrounds, motivations, expectations from a de-radicalisation 
programme and whether the interventions were having an impact. 
 
Terrorist activity in Nigeria  
Boko Haram emerged in the late 1990s4 in north-eastern Nigeria, ostensibly with the 
motive to enforce religious reform.5 Within a decade, the group had been transformed from a 
machete-wielding sect to one of the world’s deadliest terror groups. Since 2009, Boko Haram 
is said to have killed over 17,000 individuals and displaced nearly 2.2 million people, mostly 
in Nigeria’s northeast. The conflict has devastated thousands of Nigerian communities, and 
slowed the economy. Fishing markets, animal husbandry and irrigation projects have all been 
abandoned, particularly in communities around the Lake Chad region. Boko Haram has 
bombed the facilities of the United Nations in Abuja, and destroyed mosques and churches. It 
                                                 
3 The technical assistance team consisted of a combination of local and international experts in various fields. 
Members of the team were: Paul English (team leader); Saka Azimazi; Atta Barkindo; Peter Bennett; Shane 
Bryans; Ahmad Bello Dogarawa; Sherbanu Sacoor; and Andrew Ezadueyan Zamani. 
4 Cook, David. (2011). ‘‘The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria’’. CTC Sentinel 4(9):4. 
5 Chasmar, Jessica. (2014). ‘‘Boko Haram Leader Declares Islamic Caliphate in Nigeria’’, The Washington 
Times, August 24, 2014. Cf.   
http:// www.washingtontimes.com/.../boko-haram-leader-declares-caliphate-nig...(accessed August 27, 2014). 
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has targeted a large number of Muslims as well as Christians, irrespective of the ethnicity of 
their victims. The sect has killed traditional rulers, religious leaders, security forces and 
politicians. It has abducted girls and women, forcing some into marriage and turning others 
into suicide bombers.6 From June 2014 to June 2016, Boko Haram used more than 200 female 
attackers, killing over 1,000 people across four countries: Nigeria, Niger, Chad and 
Cameroon.7 The group has been responsible for more than 95 per cent of female suicide 
bombings worldwide since 2014.8  
Between 2010 and 2012, two major factions emerged following a split from Boko 
Haram, the Yusufiyya Islamic Movement (YIM) and Jamaa’atu Ansaril Muslimeen fi Biladis 
Sudaan (Vanguard for the protection of Muslims in Black Africa) or ANSARU. Both groups 
denounced Boko Haram’s strategy of killing innocent civilians.  
In August 2014, Boko Haram declared an Islamic caliphate in Gworza, Borno state, 
and took control of broad areas of land across the north-eastern region. It implemented parts 
of Sharia law within the territories under its control, cutting off people’s hands, exacting taxes 
and forcing Christian families to pay the jizya, a protection tax for non-Muslims who have 
been conquered. Shortly before Nigeria’s general elections in March 2015, a massive military 
offensive forced Boko Haram to retreat. At the same time, Boko Haram declared allegiance to 
the Islamic State (IS), calling itself the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP).  
Although there are no recognised violent extremist groups in Nigeria inspired by 
Christian doctrine, some extremist groups have emerged in predominantly Christian areas of 
the south. Such groups include the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of 
Biafra (MASSOB),9 the Ijaw Youth Council of the Niger Delta,10 the Indigenous Peoples of 
Biafra (IPOB), and recently, the Niger Delta Avengers.  Individual Christians have also been 
arrested fighting alongside Boko Haram. Understanding the complexity of violent extremism 
in Nigeria, particularly that extremist violence is committed by both Muslim and Christian 
                                                 
6 Barkindo Atta and Shephard Michelle. 2014. ‘‘The Abduction of School Girls by Boko Haram’’, Toronto Star, 
26 April, 2014. 
7 Elizabeth Pearson, 2016. Wiliyat Shaheedat: Boko Haram, Female Bombers and Islamic State, Unpublished 
Article, King’s College London, p. 4.  
8 Author’s Interview, Elizabeth Pearson, RUSI, London, 4 May, 2015 
9 Meagher, Kate. (2007). ‘‘Hijacking Civil Society: The Inside Story of Bakassi Boys Vigilante Group of South-
Eastern Nigeria’’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 45:89-106. 
10 Scott, Dolezal. (2000). ‘‘The Systematic Failure to Interpret Article IV of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights: Is There a Public Emergency in Nigeria?’’ American University International Law Review 
15 (5):1163-1209, p. 1194.  
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groups, was an important element in formulating the de-radicalisation programme in Nigeria’s 
prisons.  
 
Nigeria’s response to the terrorist threat  
Nigeria’s current counter-terrorism activities were born out of the Terrorism 
Prevention Act 2011 (as amended in 2013)11, which provided the Office of the National 
Security Adviser (ONSA) with a mandate to: act as the coordinating body for all security and 
enforcement agencies under the Act; provide support to prevent and combat acts of terrorism 
in Nigeria; ensure the effective formulation and implementation of a comprehensive counter-
terrorism strategy for Nigeria; and build the related capacity of relevant security, intelligence, 
law enforcement and military services. 
The National Security Strategy12 set out that a military ‘hard approach’ alone could not 
adequately counter ideology-based terrorist insurgency in Nigeria. The strategy made clear 
that the Government also intended to adopt a ‘soft approach’ to counter-terrorism which 
would include a countering violent extremism programme.  
Nigeria’s countering violent extremism (CVE) programme was publicly launched in 
March 2014 with the aim that it would operate horizontally and vertically across government 
and includes working with non-state actors.  The three main components of the CVE 
programme were: counter-radicalisation, strategic communications and de-radicalisation, with 
education initiatives as an additional cross-cutting activity. ONSA documentation13 described 
the CVE programme objectives as: identifying the underlying causes of radicalisation (social, 
cultural, religious and economic); developing strategies that provide solutions; introducing 
measures to change the attitudes and perceptions of potential recruits; packaging and 
disseminating the right messages to the populace through strategic communication; assessing 
the impact of insurgency on the welfare and wellbeing of affected communities; and creating 
opportunity and hope for people in the affected communities and restoring their faith in the 
government.  
                                                 
11 The Terrorism Prevention Act of 2011 was amended by the Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013, 
February 2013. 
12 National Security Strategy, Office of the National Security Adviser, November 2014. 
13 Nigeria’s Countering Violent Extremism Programme, Office of the National Security Adviser, 2014. 
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In implementing the Strategy, ONSA identified a number of objectives for de-
radicalisation activities: foster greater respect for human rights and rule of law; develop 
categorisation of suspects and convicts leading to more effective documentation; train 
relevant staff on CVE, as prison staff need to be able to professionally handle terror suspects 
and issues of rehabilitation; develop a range of expert psychologists and counsellors to 
pioneer rehabilitation efforts and train them in cognitive behavioural therapy and group 
therapy; utilise Islamic scholars to counter extremist narratives by training them on aspects of 
dialogue and religious counselling; and offer vocational training for inmates, ensuring they 
have a basic level of education and acquire skills to assist their reintegration into society. 
 
Establishing a de-radicalisation programme in Nigerian prisons 
The National Security Strategy made clear that the countering violent extremism 
programme should involve the design of a prison based de-radicalisation programme for 
prisoners under the Terrorism Prevention Act and for suspects awaiting trial, as well as an 
after-care component for those who might be released by courts or in the event of a 
government decision arising from on-going dialogue.  The National Counter Terrorism 
Strategy (NACTEST)14 stated that the Ministry of Interior, along with the Nigerian Prisons 
Service (NPS), should drive the de-radicalisation programme in prisons. 
While senior officials at ONSA had an extensive and detailed understanding of de-
radicalisation programmes, the NPS had limited experience of establishing or running 
sustained rehabilitation programmes.15 Existing international guidelines and good practice, 
such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum: Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for the 
Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders16, provided only high level 
principles and were not sufficiently detailed to enable the NPS to use them as a manual to 
establishing its de-radicalisation programme. In order to fill the knowledge and experience 
gap, ONSA obtained technical assistance from the European Union within the framework of 
                                                 
14 The National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST), was signed as a Presidential Directive 30th April 2014. 
15 Dr Fatima Akilu was a deputy director in the ONSA with responsibility for the CVE programme, at the time 
the de-radicalisation programme was developed. Dr Akilu is a psychologist but, at the time of her appointment, 
had never worked in counter-terrorism. She spent some time studying the de-radicalisation programmes of Saudi 
Arabia, Singapore and Australia. See: www.apolitical.co/how-to-turn-a-terrorist/ 
16 Global Counter Terrorism Forum:  Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for the Rehabilitation and 
Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders (2012). 
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the European Union Technical Assistance to Nigeria’s Evolving Security Challenges 
(EUTANS). This technical assistance17, provided by CiviPol (the consulting and services 
company of the French Ministry of Interior), involved: supporting ONSA and the NPS in 
designing a basic prison based de-radicalisation model; providing training to NPS personnel; 
developing risk assessment and case management tools; and writing a detailed de-
radicalisation programme guide and training manual. The EUTANS team consisted of a 
mixture of national and international experts in their specific fields. 
ONSA decided that the goal of the prison-based programme should eventually be to 
change the beliefs, views, values and attitudes of the violent extremist prisoners (de-
radicalisation) rather than only changing their behaviour (disengagement from violence). 
Interventions were focused, therefore, on changing prisoners’ radical or extremist beliefs and 
views, as well as ensuring that prisoners renounced the use of violence to achieve their 
objectives. It was also agreed early on that interventions should focus on individual de-
radicalisation and not on convincing violent extremist leaders to agree to collective 
disengagement from violence.  
Rather than establishing de-radicalisation programmes in a number of prisons 
simultaneously, the decision was made to pilot a programme in one prison (Kuje medium 
security prison) in order to concentrate limited personnel and physical resources. Kuje prison 
was physically upgraded to provide the basic facilities needed to run a de-radicalisation 
programme. A separate housing block was refurbished to accommodate the violent extremist 
prisoners, along with a mosque, teaching rooms and an outdoor sports area.  
In January 2015, ONSA and NPS held a public launch of their joint de-radicalisation 
programme. Implementation of the prison based programme began in Kuje prison in March 
the same year.  
 
Management and organisation of the programme 
An Integrated Case Management approach was developed, in which de-radicalisation 
programme personnel adopted a prisoner-centred, multidisciplinary approach to working with 
prisoners.  The adoption of this methodology enabled personnel from mixed backgrounds and 
specialism to use a common framework approach, tools and language to assess, identify 
                                                 
17 For details of the technical assistance team see footnote 2.  
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needs, monitor progress and update the outcomes during violent extremist prisoners’ 
detention and transition to release. 
The NPS personnel selected to be part of the de-radicalisation programme were 
established as Local Treatment Teams.  At NPS headquarters, a Treatment Management 
Team was created to: develop a de-radicalisation assessment tool; identify, appoint and train 
Local Treatment Team members; supervise and monitor programme delivery; collate national 
data on risks and needs; and ensure that the necessary materials, tools, and equipment were 
available for the programme.  In the prison, a Local Treatment Team was responsible for: 
undertaking risk assessments; identifying appropriate intervention; maintaining case file 
records; delivering programme interventions; and participating in case conferences. 
In addition to establishing the Local Treatment Team and Treatment Management 
Team, work was undertaken to create a supportive operational environment in Kuje prison. 
All personnel, including ancillary, supervisory and administrative personnel who did not have 
a direct role to play in delivering structured interventions, had a part to play in maintaining the 
conditions conducive to intervention delivery and to supporting progress in de-radicalisation.   
Care was also taken to ensure that the officer-in-charge of the prison, who had 
responsibility for prison security and for ensuring suitable prison regime arrangements were 
in place for the effective delivery of those programmes within his command, was fully aware 
of programme requirements and activities and that those requirements and activities were 
appropriate for the security arrangements within Kuje prison. 
The Local Treatment Team held regular team meetings to discuss day to day business, 
administration, resources, staff management, reporting, and challenges faced. Ongoing case 
reviews also took place to review progress of interventions and to allow an opportunity to 
share what worked well and lessons learned. Intervention case conferences were held at set 
intervals and the first case conference was convened no later than six weeks after a prisoner 
joined the programme.  
In addition to general prison files, it was decided to keep accurate and accessible files 
on the assessment of violent extremist prisoners and on the impact of interventions. A single 
dynamic intervention-related case file was therefore developed soon after a violent extremist 
prisoner’s admission to the prison, which was then updated and modified as he progressed 
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through the institution. Team members were encouraged to keep up-to-date clear case notes of 
every contact with each violent extremist prisoner. 
In order to make optimum use of the facilities in Kuje prison, a clear weekly timetable 
of activities was designed. The timetable proved to be a powerful administrative tool that 
provided an appropriate structural dimension to the activities required for effective 
interventions. It also contributed to an increased sense of order for violent extremist prisoners.   
The work of the Treatment Team, prisoners’ time as part of the programme, and the 
availability of facilities, were organised through the timetable. The material resources of 
equipment and supplies, which were largely related to interventions, were also indirectly 
controlled through effective timetabling.  
It was decided to separate the violent extremists from other prisoners by locating them 
in a self-contained accommodation block and not allowing them to mix with other prisoners 
during regime activities. Separating violent extremist prisoners from the general population 
makes them easier to manage and reduces the risk of them radicalising others to violence. 
This approach has been adopted in a number of other jurisdictions18 with other countries 
opting for an integration, dispersal or concentration model.  
The EUTANS technical assistance team provided coaching and mentoring for the 
Treatment Teams (both local and headquarters) throughout the operation of the pilot 
programme. This included visits to prison, meetings with the prisoners, facilitating Team 
meetings, reviewing case files, and providing refresher training. 
 
Prison personnel working on the de-radicalisation programme 
It was decided to use existing personnel from within the NPS to run the de-
radicalisation programme. A selection process identified a core group of personnel who had 
the necessary skills to deliver de-radicalisation interventions.  In many cases, the personnel 
                                                 
18 For examples of separation see:  Netherlands (Veldhuis, T.M. & Lindenberg, S. (2012a). Limits of Tolerance 
under pressure: A case study of Dutch terrorist detention policy. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 5, 425-443); 
Kenya (President Uhuru Kenyatta, Kenya, 16 February 2016, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-kenya-prison-
idUKKCN0VQ0S4; Saudi Arabia (Boucek, C., 2008, Jailing Jihadis: Saudi Arabia’s special terrorist prisons. 
Terrorism Monitor, 6, 4-6.Jones; Philippines (Morales, R., 2012, Integration versus segregation: A preliminary 
assessment of de-radicalisation in two Philippine correctional facilities. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 
Journal, 35, 211–228; Australia (Brown, D., 2008, The effect of terrorism and terrorist trials on Australian 
prison regimes, in C.Cunneen & M. Salter (Eds.), Proceedings of the Second Australia and New Zealand Critical 
Criminology Conference, Sydney, Australia, 19–20 June. (pp. 61-76). Sydney: University of New South Wales.) 
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selected were not always using those skills in their prison work, although they did sometimes 
use those skills in the community. This included prison personnel who were: imams and 
pastors; teachers; vocational instructors; arts therapists; psychologists; and medical personnel. 
A decision was made early in the planning stage not to recruit Imams from the community but 
instead to use prison staff who were faith leaders in their community. These staff members 
were selected and carefully vetted by the Government. Other NPS personnel were initially 
selected by NPS and ONSA and had to sit a number of tests before being appointed to the 
programme.  
EUTANS technical assistance team provided training for the selected de-radicalisation 
programme personnel. This training focused on: goals and objectives of prison de-
radicalisation programmes; identifying the types and purposes of de-radicalisation 
programmes and interventions, including the role of different actors; de-radicalisation risk and 
needs assessment tools and how to use them; Integrated Case Management; team working; 
managing programme interventions; information sharing; roles and responsibilities; and 
delivering interventions. 
The selected personnel were moved from their duty station to work in Kuje prison. 
Prison personnel had previously been attacked and killed by violent extremist groups as a 
consequence of working for the government in prisons holding violent extremist prisoners, so 
secure accommodation was provided for the programme team.  
In order to identify Team members, a distinctive ‘jacket’ was provided for personnel 
when working on the programme in the prison. This helped to create a common identity 
among programme Team members.   
 
De-radicalisation model adopted in Nigeria’s prisons 
De-radicalisation has been a neglected area not only in counter-terrorism policies but 
also research on violent extremism. However, some recent studies are beginning to provide 
some valuable insights.19 Any effort to understand the factors that drive or facilitate 
                                                 
19 For recent research on the subject see: Altier, M., Thoroughgood, C., & Horgan, J. (2014). Turning away from 
terrorism: Lessons from psychology, sociology, and criminology. Journal of Peace Research, 51(5), 647-661; 
Braddock, Kurt and Horgan, J. (2015). Towards a Guide for Constructing and Disseminating Counternarratives 
to Reduce Support for Terrorism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 39 (5), 381-404; Williams, M.J., Horgan, J., & 
Evans, W.P. (2015). The Critical Role of Friends in Networks for Countering Violent Extremism: Toward a 
Theory of Vicarious Help-Seeking. Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression (October). 45-65; 
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disengagement or de-radicalisation for each individual will necessarily be based in, or derived 
from, a particular context. However, although the political and ideological context may be 
very different, the social and psychological processes involved may well be similar, or at least 
comparable. 
Radicalisation to violence is a process of belief and attitude change towards an 
extremist orientation that justifies the use of violence to achieve its goals. In some cases the 
process may take many years, with other individuals it can take only a few months. 
Underpinning the approach of de-radicalisation is the concept that if an individual can adopt 
radical beliefs and attitudes that lead to violent extremism, then that individual can also 
abandon the use of violence through changing those beliefs and attitudes that justify its use.  
It is clear from the research that no single model of de-radicalisation is universally 
applicable.20 Interventions cannot simply be transplanted from one country to another, even 
within the same region.21 To be effective, efforts must be highly tailored to the country and 
culture involved, the nature of violent extremist group, the individual prisoners participating 
and the environment into which the former violent extremist detainee is ultimately released. 
A basic de-radicalisation model was adopted for use in Nigerian prisons, consisting of 
four stages: engagement; risk assessment; needs assessment; and interventions.22  
 
Engagement: The first stage involved the Treatment Team members getting to know the 
violent extremist prisoners, establishing a positive professional relationship, developing 
trust and entering into a constructive dialogue.  
 
Risk: Once Treatment Team members had engaged the violent extremist prisoners, the 
next stage was for the Treatment team to undertake a thorough risk assessment to 
                                                                                                                                                        
Horgan, J., Altier, M. B., Shortland, N., & Taylor, M. (2016).  Walking Away: The Disengagement and De-
Radicalization of a Violent Right-Wing Extremist. Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 
(March), 1-15. 
20 For case studies and good practice on disengagement programmes and interventions, see: UNODC Handbook 
on Managing Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalisation to Violence in Prison (Bryans, S. 
– forthcoming October 2016). 
21 Porges, M. (2011) Reform School for Radicals: Deradicalization programs are justified by their indirect 
effects. The American Interest. Volume 6, number 6. 
22 Based on the ‘risk-needs-responsivity’ framework: Andrews, D. A., Bonta, J., & Hoge, R. D. (1990). 
Classification for effective rehabilitation: Rediscovering psychology. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 17, 19-52; 
Andrews, D. A., & Bonta, J. (2006). The psychology of criminal conduct (4th ed.). Newark, NJ: LexisNexis 
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identify the reasons for the prisoner becoming a violent extremist offender and the level 
of risk the prisoner currently posed. 
 
Needs: Having identified the underpinning reasons for a violent extremist prisoner’s 
involvement in violent extremism, Treatment Team members identified risk-related 
needs. That is, the activity that would help to reduce the risk that the prisoner would 
engage in, or advocate, future violent extremist activity. 
 
Response: The fourth stage was to implement the interventions that would meet the 
violent extremist prisoners’ identified risk-related needs and thereby reduce risk. 
 
In reality, the process turned out to be iterative rather than linear. Treatment Team 
members continued to engage the violent extremist prisoners throughout the programme, risk 
and needs assessments were undertaken on an ongoing basis and changed to reflect the 
progress, or lack of progress, that the violent extremist prisoner was making. New or 
additional interventions were identified as the prisoners’ risk and needs changed.  
 
Assessing prisoners’ risk and needs 
Once the refurbishment of Kuje prison had been completed and de-radicalisation 
programme personnel trained, 45 adult male violent extremist prisoners were identified to 
participate in the pilot de-radicalisation programme. One of the prisoners was sentenced, the 
others were all pre-trial detainees; 48 per cent were aged between 31 and 40 years old; 81 per 
cent Muslims; 60 per cent married and 35 per cent educated to at least secondary school level. 
Most of the prisoners were alleged to be ‘foot soldiers’ and low level operatives in violent 
extremist groups, who showed low levels of deeply entrenched radicalisation. Others were 
alleged to have: funded violent extremism; accommodated violent extremist members; 
provided a religious narrative for violent extremism and recruited fighters; or operated as 
communications and logistics experts. A small number of the prisoners were identified as 
highly radicalised, influential and powerful and who exercised a degree of charismatic 
leadership. A number denied any degree of commitment to violent extremism, although this 
needs to be seen in the context of their pre-trial (remand) status. There were also cases of 
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individuals who were highly educated to university higher degree level and came from 
privileged backgrounds. 
The first task for the Treatment Team was to engage the violent extremist prisoners. 
Many of the violent extremist prisoners were, at least initially, resistant or rejected 
participation in the programme as they were suspicious of the efforts of officials and their 
motivation for these interventions. Team members built a relationship with the violent 
extremist prisoners by seeking to arrange for their basic needs, such as elements of 
accommodation, contact with family and healthcare, to be met by the institution’s 
administration. Once a constructive relationship had been established, members of the Team 
were able to undertake a formal risk assessment of each violent extremist prisoner.  
Members of the Treatment Team were trained to use structured professional 
judgement and decision-making in conducting the assessments of violent extremist prisoners. 
Information was gathered, weighted and combined according to the Team’s judgment, 
assisted by a specialist risk assessment tool. The approach was therefore empirically guided, 
as each Team member was encouraged to consider the same set of risk assessment factors for 
each violent extremist prisoner they assessed.  
Many of the existing generic risk assessment tools and protocols have questionable 
relevance to violent extremists because the factors used to assess risk did not relate to the 
background and motivations of this group of violent offenders.  A limited number of tools 
have been developed specifically to assess violent extremist prisoners.23 These tools have, to 
date, only been used with limited numbers of prisoners, and in specific jurisdictions and 
contexts. It is not realistic in many cases to deploy tools as comprehensive as these in 
jurisdictions with limited resources, in post-conflict situations, or when there are many 
hundreds of violent extremist prisoners that require assessment.  
The EUTANS technical assistance team therefore supported the NPS in designing a 
simple de-radicalisation assessment tool for use in prisons in Nigeria. Following a review of 
                                                 
23 See for example: Pressman E., Duits, N., Rinne, T and Flockton, J. (2016) VERA–2R Violence Extremism 
Risk Assessment – version 2 Revised: A structured professional judgement approach, Nederlands Institut voor 
Forensische Psychiatrie en Psychologie; and Lloyd, M. and Dean, C. (2015) The Development of Structured 
Guidelines for Assessing Risk in Extremist Offenders, Journal of Threat Assessment and Management, 2015, 
Vol. 2, No. 1, 40–52. 
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existing tools, including VERA-224, a basic tool consisted of 47 indicators grouped under a 
number of headings was developed: motivation for committing a violent extremist act; level 
of commitment to violent extremist acts; personality (attitudes, beliefs), feelings, behaviour; 
context and intent; background, history and capability; and any risk reduction factors. 
Information was gathering through interviewing the prisoners, observations of behaviour, 
prison and court records and information from the other government services and agencies.  
The tool served as a guide and provided a minimum set of risk factors that the 
Treatment Team should consider. In some instances, some of these factors were not relevant; 
in others, additional risk factors had to be added. Each assessment considered all risk factors, 
even if some were later rejected as not relevant to that particular case. It was made clear to the 
Treatment Team that risk assessment is not an exact science and that it would not provide a 
definitive answer as to whether a violent extremist prisoner is likely to re-offend after release. 
Such tools are indicators of underlying reasons for someone being a violent extremist and can 
provide some insight into whether the risk of re-offending is reducing as a result of 
interventions. It was reiterated that assessments should be validated using other sources of 
information such as staff observations and security intelligence. The key point being that 
assessment informs decisions about how risk can best be managed and mitigated in the future. 
It was recognised that assessing risk had to be done on an ongoing and regular basis, 
and at a minimum of every six months. The assessments undertaken later in the process were 
found to be more accurate as personnel, over the months following the violent extremist 
prisoners’ arrival at Kuje prison, had more time to interact with and observe them. Subsequent 
risk assessments also enabled members of the Treatment Team to reflect on whether the 
prisoner has shown willingness to complete interventions and the outcome of their 
participation in those interventions. 
 
Understanding individual motivations for violent extremism 
Undertaking the detailed risk assessment enabled the Team to identify which of the 
wide variety of motivations and factors have ‘pulled’ and ‘pushed’ individuals towards 
violent extremism. Understanding why individual prisoners have gone down the path of 
                                                 
24 Pressman, D. and Flockton, J. (2014) Violent extremist risk assessment; issues and applications of the VERA-
2 in a high-security correctional setting, chapter 9 in Silke, A. (ed) Prisons, Terrorism and Extremist – critical 
issues in management, radicalisation and reform. 
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violent extremism was critical for a number of reasons including to: design and apply 
appropriate interventions; monitor progress and impact of those interventions; and determine 
the risk of future violent acts. 
From the risk assessment it was clear that each prisoner was unique and that factors 
that motivated them varied from person to person. That said, a number of underpinning 
generic reasons were identified among several of the violent extremist prisoners in Kuje 
prison, including: lack of socioeconomic opportunities; marginalisation and discrimination; 
violations of human rights and the rule of law; poor governance (particularly related to 
corruption); victimisation; distortion of religious beliefs or political ideologies to justify the 
use of violence; ethnic and cultural issues; and charismatic leadership and social networks. 
The risk assessments also found that some people got ‘sucked into’, or pressurised into, 
joining violent extremist groups because of friends/family involvement, others were 
conditioned or lied to; and some were threatened and coerced.  
 
De-radicalisation programme interventions  
Having made an assessment of the risks posed by the violent extremist prisoner, the 
Local Treatment Team identified the risk-related needs. In some cases, those needs related to 
a lack of education or vocational skills, in other cases the prisoner needed faith-based 
education or cognitive support.  
In order to respond to the identified needs, a range of interventions were implemented 
that focused on: enabling the violent extremist prisoner to fulfil their needs legitimately; 
helping them develop supportive attitudes, beliefs and thinking; enhancing the prisoners’ 
emotional tolerance and acceptance; increasing their personal agency; and supporting 
prisoners to express values and pursuing goals legitimately. Many of these changes required a 
holistic approach across a number of disciplines and specialisms and a range of interventions. 
The interventions were conceived as planned and structured processes designed to 
assist the violent extremist prisoners to abandon engagement in violent extremist acts or, for 
those considered to be at serious risk of becoming further radicalised, to avoid committing 
such offences in future. The interventions were also intended to encourage prisoners to 
disengage from associating with a violent extremist group or causes and, if de-radicalisation 
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was to be lasting and complete, to relinquish those beliefs which justify acts of violent 
extremism.  
No specific rewards were offered to the prisoners to participate in the programme.  
There were, however, a number of incentives such as access to activities, assistance of social 
work team with family or legal contact, very occasional assistance with medical conditions, 
and meetings sometimes includes the provision of some refreshment. 
As interventions should vary from country to country, to reflect the nature of the 
violent conflict, cultural and political context of that country, and available resources and 
expertise, seven types of interventions were developed for use in the de-radicalisation 
programme in Nigerian prisons. 
 
Motivational interviewing: Motivational interviewing underpinned all other interventions. The 
purpose was to encourage the prisoner to ‘buy into’ the programme, build trust and lay the 
foundation for de-radicalisation. It was intended to engage the prisoner in conversations that 
would challenge beliefs, attitudes and behaviour regarding violent extremism. The approach 
used basic counselling skills and open-ended questions that enabled the prisoner to recall 
details of difficult events and life experiences, affirming experiences and acknowledging 
personal strengths.  
 
Vocational training and work experience: Vocational training and work experience were 
useful ways of keeping prisoners occupied, helping to relieve boredom and inactivity that 
could have an adverse impact on their physical and emotional wellbeing. There were also 
more positive reasons for assisting prisoners to acquire work skills, including equipping them 
to find employment on release and thereby provide financially for themselves and their 
families. In Kuje prison, prisoners were given the opportunity develop trade skills that match 
demand for services in the communities that they are likely to return to. This has helped to lay 
a foundation for resettlement and reintegration.  Prisoners at Kuje prison were offered training 
in carpentry work, bead-making, tailoring and basic electrical work.  
 
Education and cultural activities: Education is acknowledged as an essential element in 
personal development. In the case of Boko Haram prisoners, education can lead to a better 
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understanding of the social and economic factors that have contributed to their 
disillusionment with mainstream society. In Kuje prison, as well as basic literacy (English and 
Arabic) and numeracy, the prisoners had the opportunity to develop computer skills, ranging 
from learning to use a keyboard to simple word processing. 
 
Art Therapy: A range of creative pursuits were adapted as therapeutic interventions, including 
creative arts such as: music; drumming; dance; calligraphy; group performances; and 
traditional handicrafts. The art component was combined with vocational skills acquisition 
and prisoners took bead-making classes, eventually producing jewellery and decorative items 
that could be sold. The creative process also enabled the communication of feelings and 
emotions associated with significant life events. The skill and sensitivity of the art teachers in 
nurturing a communicative relationship with the prisoners was paramount.  
 
Sports and games: Sports intervention was considered more than just the provision of outdoor 
exercise. As part of the de-radicalisation programme, sports were used to promote personal 
development and growth, and proved to encourage pro-social thinking and behaviour. It also 
served as a platform for engagement and rehabilitation. When the programme started, none of 
the prisoners took part in sports. More recently, football leagues have been organised with 
teams from the prisoners, prison staff and general prison population, which has helped to 
improve the atmosphere of mutual trust and communication. A range of sports interventions 
were used including volleyball and football.  
 
Religious Intervention: The significance of religious interventions was based on the role that 
religious ideology plays in violent extremism in Nigeria. Since the approach was aimed at 
stemming the tide of radicalisation and changing behaviour, faith-based interventions required 
understanding violent extremist ideologies and countering them with superior scholarly 
arguments. The narratives applied for countering extremist ideologies were not dictated by the 
views of any particular Islamic or Christian sect. Rather, they were directed by the central 
messages of Islam and Christianity with regards to tolerance, balance, the spirit of co-
existence and social etiquettes that guide good relationship with others and bring peace and 
security in society. Basic tenets of both Islam and Christianity were reiterated with prisoners. 
  
 
 
Atta Barkindo & Shane Bryans: De-Radicalising Prisoners in Nigeria: developing a basic 
prison based de-radicalisation programme 
17
Summer 2016 
Nr. 7 
ISSN: 2363-9849         
Furthermore, the teaching of Islam and Christianity on peace, justice, human rights, tolerance 
and co-existence were emphasised in line with the contents of Qur’an and the Bible. Christian 
and Islamic teaching on moderation and warning against extremism were also equally 
highlighted.  In many cases, the Muslim prisoners had to be taught Islam from scratch, as they 
had never seen a Qur’an before. Others had a very rudimentary understanding of religion, so 
the more that they were engaged, the more they began to understand that violent extremism 
was not a fight for religion, but rather a fight for power and control, and that religion was used 
by Boko Haram as an instrument for recruitment.  
 
Psychological and Counselling Interventions: These interventions underpinned the decision-
making process required to change prisoners’ belief systems, resolve psychological conflicts 
associated with these changes, give up related antisocial behaviours and acquire interpersonal 
skills for reintegration into the society. Through individual risk assessments, as part of the 
case conference process, psychosocial antecedents and rehabilitation imperatives were 
uncovered. The provision of psychological and counselling services assisted prisoners to work 
through these issues and contributed to their rehabilitation.  
 
In responding to issues which may have led prisoners towards violent extremism, it 
was also necessary to address other factors such as serious alcohol or drug misuse, and mental 
health conditions. These were identified through routine medical and admission screening and 
addressed by specialist personnel, so as not to have an adversely impact on the prisoners’ 
ability to engage in de-radicalisation interventions.  
The scheduling and nature of interventions evolved as the Treatment Team gained 
experience, built their understanding of the violent extremist population, and as the prisoners’ 
rate and nature of engagement increased. The range and extent of classroom materials 
available to the programme also influenced the delivery of interventions. Some of the 
interventions led to group activities, e.g. sports, classroom teaching, health lectures. Other 
interventions, usually involving faith leaders, psychologists and social workers, tended to 
involve one (or more) team members working with individual prisoners.  
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Impact of the de-radicalisation programme 
Despite the massive investment of resources in this field, few jurisdictions have 
elaborated robust and succinct methodologies to evaluate the success, or otherwise, of de-
radicalisation programmes. Likewise, the academic literature on the effectiveness of 
interventions generally remains in its infancy and interventions that have been evaluated often 
do not meet scientific standards.25 A review of 135 studies found that they were mostly 
anecdotal, in which no explicit reference to theory and no empirical quantitative or qualitative 
data was reported.26 
At a policy level, ONSA decided the goal of the prison-based programme was to 
change the beliefs, views, values and attitudes of the violent extremist prisoners (de-
radicalisation) rather than only changing their behaviour (disengagement from violence). 
Measuring changes in beliefs, attitudes and behaviour is challenging within the custodial 
environment.  It was therefore decided to use a number of indicators of the impact of 
interventions including: changes in the prisoners’ behaviour; level of engagement with the 
interventions; number of institutional incidents; and number of interventions completed.  
The de-radicalisation programme in Kuje prison is already having a positive impact on 
prisoners, staff and prison management.   
 
‘We had a lot of crying in class. At first there was some defiance and especially of 
the imams, because they felt they had more knowledge than the imams, but as time 
went on, as they began to really understand what the Koran was saying, there 
were a lot of tears. People would say things like, “I wasted my life”. You know, 
all of a sudden you’re confronted with what you’ve done. You’ve committed 
atrocities in the name of this religion when now you understand that religion 
actually preaches the exact opposite. How can you now justify why you raped 
                                                 
25 See for example: Horgan, J. and Braddock, K. (2010) Rehabilitating the terrorists?: challenges in assessing the 
effectiveness of de-radicalisation programs, Terrorism and Political Violence, 22, 267-291; Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. 
(2010). Violent Radicalization in Europe: What we know and what we do not know. Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, 33, 797-814; Carline, A. (2011) Report to the home secretary of independent oversight of Prevent 
review and Strategy. London: HM Government; Christmann, K. (2012). Preventing religious radicalisation and 
violent extremism: A systematic review of the research evidence. UK: Youth Justice Board; Lindekilde, L. 
(2012) Introduction: assessing the effectiveness of counter-radicalisation policies in northwestern Europe. 
Critical Studies on Terrorism, 5, 335-344.  
26 Feddes, A. and Gallucci, M. (2015) A Literature Review on Methodology used in Evaluating Effects of 
Preventive and De-radicalisation Interventions, Journal for de-radicalization, winter 15/16, No. 5. 
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somebody or killed a child or placed a bomb, so it’s tough, it’s a rocky road, it’s 
going to take them a long time.27 
 
Violent extremist prisoners who previously refused to engage with staff are now 
entering into positive dialogue and, in most cases, responding constructively. The 
interventions are providing opportunities to develop alternative ways to meet their needs and 
some are questioning their involvement with violent extremist groups. Their dissatisfaction 
and disillusionment with their involvement is being explored.  Prisoners are gaining valuable 
vocational skills and others are learning to read and write. Inconsistencies and inaccuracies in 
their current beliefs that support violence are being highlighted. Many are gaining a more 
detailed knowledge of religious texts and alternative interpretations.  
An ongoing assessment programme was put in place that had the purpose of measuring 
changes in level of risk. Given the sensitivity of the information gathered, the authors were 
not able to directly access the prisoners’ files. The most recent risk assessments were reported 
as showing a lowering of risks across a number of indicators for many prisoners. However, it 
is still very early days in the programme and it will be important to monitor whether 
prisoners’ initial level of engagement and change is maintained.  
As the programme has been operating for such a short period of time, there has been no 
real feedback to the judiciary and therefore participation has had no impact on sentencing or 
prison terms. The delays within the criminal justice system mean that so few prisoners are 
currently sentenced it will take many years to identify any changes to pattern of sentencing 
under the Terrorism Prevention Act. All prisoners who are sentenced have the possibility of 
one third remission at the discretion of Officer in Charge (Prison Director). It is likely that 
involvement in the programme will contribute to the decision making process at the 
appropriate time, but this has not been tested yet. 
As with any prison programme, the real test of success is what happens with the 
prisoner after release. At a simple level, desistance from violence is the desired outcome of 
disengagement and reintegration interventions and it is usually measured by an indicator such 
as re-offending, reconviction or re-imprisonment for a violent extremist offence. But 
                                                 
27 Dr Fatima Akilu, former deputy director of ONSA with responsibility for the CVE programme, quoted in:  
How to turn a terrorist (16 October 2015). Available at: www.apolitical.co/how-to-turn-a-terrorist/ 
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recidivism rates can be misleading. They are often inaccurate, reflecting only what is known 
to security services and the criminal justice system, which can be limited. Measuring the 
impact of interventions also suffers from the ‘dilemma of attribution’, that is, relating 
improved indicators, such as reduced incidences of violent extremism and recidivism rates, to 
the interventions themselves. There are several factors (local, national and international in 
nature) that can affect operations and the success or failure of interventions.28  
For prison staff, particularly those directly engaged with the programme, it has opened 
up a new channel of handling and engaging constructively with prisoners. The relationship 
between prison staff and violent extremist prisoners improved overall. The mutual trust that 
also developed between staff and prisoners inspired more violent extremist prisoners to 
engage with the programme. In addition, there were incidents of improved relationships 
between violent extremist prisoners and the general prison staff who were not part of the 
programme. There were also indications of easing tensions between the violent extremist 
prisoners and the general prison population. 
Prison management has seen the benefit of the programme reviving the culture of 
documentation, classification and the importance of attending to prisoners on individual, as 
well as on a group, basis.  
 
Lessons for policy and practice in other jurisdictions  
Without significant commitment to an extensive programme of training, prison 
personnel are far less equipped to manage and implement de-radicalisation programmes. 
Even where prison personnel have benefitted from a high standard of education, lengthy 
internal training and are well equipped for their duties, as was the case in Nigeria, there is 
often a lack of knowledge about the implementation and management of the de-radicalisation 
programmes. In addition, with limited opportunities (resources, infrastructure, facilities, time) 
to implement general rehabilitation programmes, as is the case in many countries, that 
element of professional duties has had less chance to develop. The basis of de-radicalisation 
programmes, which is in part about individualisation, is almost absent from general prison 
operations, particularly in post-conflict, fragile and low resource countries. In such countries, 
                                                 
28 GCTF: Sydney Memorandum on Challenges and Strategies on the Management of Violent Extremist 
Detainees (2012), Internal Challenge 6. 
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risk assessment practice is generally more to with risks associated with escape and internal 
order and less based on more thorough understanding of a range of risks and causes of risks. 
Professional groups also tend to work in silos rather than inter-disciplinarily towards common 
goals. To address these gaps, personnel who will be delivering de-radicalisation programmes 
require an extensive training and mentoring programme to provide the necessary professional 
knowledge and skills for them to fulfil their individual responsibilities, to introduce the 
operational skills that enable them to run and oversee the programme and the professional 
techniques and qualities to work as part of a team in a complex programme.  
 
The professional conduct of prison personnel in delivering de-radicalisation programmes can 
have a significant impact on the degree of trust that violent extremists have in their 
government. Conditions in prisons can be harsh. Overcrowding, particularly in urban prisons, 
increases pressure on the system, resulting in staff having to struggle to meet the basic needs 
of the prisoners. Despite reform efforts and improvements within many prison systems, those 
detained often expect nothing less than a tough experience. For prisoners who have previously 
been detained by security or military forces, they carry their previous experiences of 
detention. When Treatment Team members work with violent extremists with transparency, 
empathy and decency, this can have a positive impact on the way the prisoners view 
government and its institutions. In the Nigerian de-radicalisation programme, Team members 
had very few resources to attend to the immediate needs of prisoners (such as health, legal 
issues, family contact, diet etc.), but they worked with the prisoners and the prison authorities 
to try and resolve such issues when possible. Beyond meeting immediate needs, the Treatment 
Team gave time; they empathised with prisoners and were neither harsh nor judgemental in 
their interaction and treatment. The prisoners stated to independent observers that this was the 
first time in their direct experience that government had showed an interest and they were 
treated with dignity and humanely.  
 
The consensual nature of de-radicalisation programmes is essential for ensuring legitimate 
and safe commitment from violent extremist prisoners. The de-radicalisation process has to 
commence and continue through mutual consent. Desistance, disengagement and de-
radicalisation will only be legitimately sustained if those who commit to the programme do so 
  
 
 
Atta Barkindo & Shane Bryans: De-Radicalising Prisoners in Nigeria: developing a basic 
prison based de-radicalisation programme 
22
Summer 2016 
Nr. 7 
ISSN: 2363-9849         
of their own free will. As part of the Nigerian de-radicalisation programme, Team members 
met with representatives of the prisoners to run through the basis of the programme, 
expectations, responsibilities and safeguards. Senior custodial officers within the prison were 
also involved in the meetings. Prisoners were all given the opportunity to sign a consent form 
before joining the programme. Throughout the programme, prisoners were able to disengage 
without consequences. Those who were thinking of leaving the programme were also given 
the opportunity to discuss their decision and efforts were made to overcome the reasons they 
had for wanting to leave. Only a couple of prisoners decided not to participate in the 
programme.  
 
A combination of different professional groups, working in unison for a common goal, can 
offer opportunities that reflect the diversity of the violent extremist prisoner group. Based on 
experience with the Nigerian de-radicalisation programme, prisoners participating in de-
radicalisation programmes will be a diverse group that may include those who: have been 
charged with a variety of offences; are alleged to have offended at different times during an 
emerging and changing insurgency; come from vastly different social and educational 
backgrounds; have different first languages; and display a wider range of behaviours. The 
diversity in the violent extremist prisoner population dictates that a risk-response-
interventions model should be inter-disciplinary. Often prisoners would build a relationship 
with different professionals, regardless of the factors which drove them to violent extremism. 
These were not based on specific risk-related needs but on interests in activities or other 
personal factors. Those initial interests facilitated building a relationship with the individual 
Team member, which in turn led to wider engagement with the whole Treatment Team.  In 
some cases, activities such as sports or arts were points of entry for prisoners before they 
started counselling or faith-based programmes, which demand a greater degree of personal 
exploration and reflection that can only come through trust. Some prisoners found their initial 
relationship with the Treatment Team through faith-based dialogue and counselling, as they 
identified with the role and authority of religious leaders. Once trust had been built through 
that relationship, they could then move onto other programmes such as education.  
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Delays within the criminal justice system can be an obstacle to a successful de-radicalisation 
programme. The slow pace of justice and the uncertainty this raises for prisoners participating 
in a de-radicalisation programme can be a serious hindrance to its success. Where a prisoner 
has been charged but has not yet had his case heard, they may not feel confident and safe in 
discussing their background and experiences with Treatment Team members who are 
government officials. The Treatment Team in Nigeria had a ‘do no harm’ approach in 
delivering the programme but the uncertainties that awaiting trial brings inculcates caution 
and poses a limitation on interaction between Team members and prisoners. In addition, the 
uncertainty over a timeframe for un-convicted prisoners makes the planning of the 
programmes much more complex and this places stress on scheduling and planning for the 
Treatment Team.  
 
Realistic expectations for those in the de-radicalisation programme need to be established 
early and should be managed through long term stable commitment from government and its 
partners. Any de-radicalisation programme should be clear on what it will deliver and have 
consistent levels of support from national and international entities to avoid inconsistent 
provision and mixed messages being given to violent extremist prisoners participating in the 
programme. The ebb and flow of programme support from the prison administration and 
government bodies in Nigeria proved to be an impediment to effective programme delivery. 
Commitments and assurances on the content and operation of the programme were not always 
forthcoming. This was particularly destabilising for those whose experience of government 
had been negative and where the de-radicalisation programme was seeking to build trust.  
 
A de-radicalisation programme needs to work with prison authorities to enhance 
classification of prisoners in order to ensure only appropriate prisoners participate in de-
radicalisation programmes. Key to the stability and efficiency of a de-radicalisation 
programme is ensuring that only appropriate prisoners enter the programme. In Nigeria, the 
programme was based in an existing prison facility, where the classification system was 
already established and where prisoners were classified as violent extremists based on their 
documentation (such as their warrant) and the outcome of the Admissions Board process. 
These alone did not always prove to be sufficient to determine with accuracy whether a 
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prisoner was a violent extremist, particularly as 70 per cent of prisoners were pre-trial and 
limited written information was available. The result was that there was some initial 
uncertainty regarding which prisoners should be considered for the de-radicalisation 
programme. 
   
Risk assessment tools should be tailored to the national context and kept as simple and 
straightforward as possible.  A number of risk assessment tools have been developed for use 
with violent extremists. These tend to be complex, resource intensive to administer and used 
only by specialists such as psychologists.  In post-conflict and low resource countries, using 
such tools is not feasible or practical, particularly where there are large numbers of violent 
extremists in detention and few, if any, specialists employed by the prison administration. The 
development of a short risk assessment tool for use in Nigeria proved to be very successful in 
providing a means to identify the main drivers for each prisoner’s involvement in violent 
extremism, establishing their risk-related needs, and monitoring any changes in risk level.    
 
Thorough documentation should be an essential part of any de-radicalisation programme, 
together with a systematic collation and robust analysis of the processes and outcomes of the 
programme. Any de-radicalisation programme should be designed to record and measure 
change over time and be based on inter-disciplinary opinion and evidence, multiple sources of 
information, and structured judgment. An “if it is not documented, it has not happened” 
approach should be adopted. While this was completed to some extent in the Nigerian de-
radicalisation programme, with a good standard of individual records, case files they were not 
collated and the findings and conclusions were not systematically interrogated by an 
independent oversight body. Emerging patterns of change were also not documented, collated 
or analysed with sufficient rigour to enable decision makers to make informed choices. The 
monitoring and evaluation development work that was undertaken during the programme 
came too late for it to be an entrenched element of operations and oversight.  
 
The process for reintegrating violent extremist prisoners into the community should be a key 
element in any strategy for reducing violent extremism. The slowness of the justice process in 
Nigeria, and the sentencing tariff in the Terrorism Prevention Act, mean that there will be no 
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controlled releases of convicted violent extremist prisoners in the foreseeable future. It was 
decided therefore not to include a pre-release or reintegration element into the programme at 
this initial stage. In fact, a very small number of unconvicted prisoners who were part of the 
original programme were released by the court and received no formal follow up or support 
after their release. Even with effective disengagement interventions happening in prison, if re-
integration preparation is not put in place, the chances of the former violent extremist prisoner 
re-offending are increased. Consideration should therefore be given to building in basic re-
integration elements into programme design. Post release support, supervision and monitoring 
may require new legislative provision in some jurisdictions.  
 
This paper has set out how ONSA and NPS went about establishing a de-radicalisation 
programme in a Nigerian prison. The key elements of that programme, including: creating a 
supportive operating environment; risk and needs assessment; types of intervention; and 
programme management and staffing, are all potentially replicable in low resource, post-
conflict and fragile states. The lessons identified in the paper, drawn from the operation of the 
programme during its first 18 months, can inform the implementation of prison based de-
radicalisation programmes in similar jurisdictions. 
  
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
